Anna Korppoo, Research Professor, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, with contributions from Coltrane Morley-Williams, Climate Strategies
The Russian delegation was one of the largest delegations at UNFCC COP29 in Baku with around 900 participants in total, comprising senior officials, high-ranking executives and a large number of experts from fossil fuel companies. This level of representation illustrates the importance of the COP29 conference for Russia and the objectives that it hoped to achieve, distinct from those of most participating delegations.
Russian climate diplomacy
According to Vladimir Ilyichev, Deputy Minister of Economic Development for Russia, ‘it is important to understand that the transition away from fossil fuels is only one of many possible ways to reduce emissions’[1]. This evasive approach to climate mitigation highlights Russia’s position at COP and is the pretence under which it conducted bilateral negotiations aimed at developing oil and gas projects, including with Azerbaijan – the host country of COP29. Russia also used the international platform to convince other of its climate leadership, holding daily meetings with predominantly Russian experts and experts from ‘friendly’ developing countries, to present its achievements in terms of GHG emission reductions.
In reality, the main objectives of the Russian delegation were to minimize the potential impacts of any COP decisions on Russia’s fossil fuel and energy sector and the Russian federal budget, a significant portion of which is directed towards its continued war efforts, while also promoting its foreign policy interests. In its pavilion, Russia openly promoted fossil fuels, calling fossil gas ‘the last fuel for humanity’[2]. Meanwhile, Maxim Reshetnikov, the Minister of Economic Development for Russia, stated that at COP29 ‘Russia has managed to prevent Western countries from imposing additional obligations and costs on our enterprises and budget’ [3].
According to the ‘Strategy of socio-economic development with low level of GHG emissions’[4], adopted by the government in 2021, annual investments into low carbon development in Russia should comprise up to 2% of national GDP. However, these investment plans have radically changed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Since February 2022, the development of the Strategy implementation plan, originally due to be adopted in 2022, has been frozen. Similarly, the investment targets on low carbon development have been set aside. In the absence of genuine mitigation measures, Russia’s proclaimed climate leadership had to be confirmed at COP29 through other means – the presentation of revised data on Russia’s net GHG emissions.
According to re-calculations using ‘sovereign methodology’, presented for the first time at COP29, Russia’s GHG emissions have decreased by 34%, or 0.56 billion tons of CO2 equivalent, compared to previous GHG inventory reports. The decreased GHG emissions mainly result from a reassessment of the carbon dioxide absorption by Russian forests. According to the representatives of the Russian delegation, this new data will ‘allow the Russian economy to save 4.5 trillion rubles on decarbonization measures and provide 3 trillion rubles for the Russian budget’[5]. The recalculation has already been labelled as an ‘imitational’ approach to climate policy[6] and the method is yet to be approved by UNFCCC experts.
Russian climate projects
The adoption of the final decisions on Article 6 at COP29 is considered by the Russian delegation as another achievement of the Russian negotiation team. ‘The consolidation of the principle of equal access of countries to the created infrastructure of carbon markets’, according to Reshetnikov, means that ‘Russian projects and carbon units should not face politically motivated restrictions’[7]. The precise meaning of ‘politically motivated restrictions’ is unclear, however, by projects, Reshetnikov is referring to Russia’s so-called ‘climate projects’ implemented in accordance with Russian legislation, a list of which is presented on the Russian carbon registry website[8].
The distinctive features of Russia’s climate project implementation system, as it is known, are its complete inconsistency with the regulatory provisions of Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, notably requirements on transparency and environmental integrity, related to project additionality and baseline setting. For example, under Russian legislation, project additionality is defined as being ‘additional to the legally binding requirements of Russian legislation’ [9], radically different to international agreements at COP26 requiring that ‘additionality shall be demonstrated using a robust assessment that shows the activity would not have occurred in the absence of the incentives from the mechanism, taking into account all relevant national policies…’[10]. This alternative understanding makes it possible for almost any energy project to be considered as a ‘climate project’. For this reason, many registered Russian ‘climate projects’ are not designed to support the development of renewable energy sources, but instead to prolong the use of fossil fuel energy sources. The forced closure of many independent international and domestic environmental organizations and exit of competent and experienced foreign verification bodies from Russia, since 2022, also makes transparency requirements for Article 6 project implementation increasingly difficult to meet. Information on the current accredited national climate project verification bodies is opaque and so their true level of competency or the presence of any conflicts of interest is impossible to judge.
Regardless of these inconsistencies, Russia expects to sell emission reductions on the international carbon market to countries, funds, and companies that, as far as Russia is concerned, will be interested in such projects. According to one representative of the Russian delegation, ‘the development of the climate project industry will allow for a further reduction in net emissions by 500-1000 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year and can also serve as a basis for deepening international multilateral climate cooperation through mechanisms for cross-border transfer of projects results’ [11] – so called ‘carbon units’, otherwise known as carbon credits. Surprisingly, despite their low quality, Russia’s carbon credits, have already found their first foreign buyer, the Arab Investment Fund, Equity International General Trading, according to data presented at COP29[12]. Russia expects to scale up of this industry both at the country-level through inter-governmental organisations, such as BRICS+, and within the framework of business associations, including the Association of European business[13]. For this, relevant meetings and roundtables were held at COP29, aimed at increasing climate cooperation[14].
Taking all this into account, the COP29 conference in Baku was deemed a big success by Russian officials. However, the urgent question now is whether other countries will want to or can be convinced to join such Russian-led initiatives in the future. This expansion of unverified and unvalidated climate projects, ignoring internationally agreed standards that aim to maximise environmental integrity, poses a considerable risk to genuine climate mitigation efforts. This comes at a time when collective faith in multi-lateral climate governance hangs in the balance.
Climate Strategies’ research report, Russian Climate Strategy: Imitating Leadership, published in 2023, provided analysis on the implementation of Russia’s carbon neutrality target highlighting the imitational nature of Russian climate policy. Upcoming research, due to be published in early 2025, will explore Russian climate policy developments and international perspectives on Russian climate project implementation. Particular attention will be paid to Russian attempts to propagate its methods among ‘friendly’ countries and intergovernmental organisations and the risks associated with the further expansion of such imitational measures. Keep an eye out on our website and social media channels and stay tuned for more updates.
[1] https://report.az/ru/cop29/maksim-reshetnikov-itogi-cop29-yavlyayutsya-diplomaticheskoj-pobedoj-azerbajdzhana/
[3] https://economy.gov.ru/material/dokumenty/prikaz_minekonomrazvitiya_rossii_ot_11_maya_2022_g_248.html
[4] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf
[5] https://ria.ru/20241112/sor29-1983387086.html
[6] https://ria.ru/20241112/sor29-1983387086.html
[7] https://aebrus.ru/ru/news/aeb_at_cop29_/
[8] https://russiaspivottoasia.com/brics-carbon-agreement-expected-from-cop29-commitments/
[9]https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/minekonomrazvitiya_rf_na_cop_29_vystupilo_za_snizhenie_urovnya_vybrosov_bez_riskov_dlya_ekonomicheskogo_rosta.html
[10] https://caneecca.org/rossiya-poluchila-antipremiyu-na-cop29/
[11]https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/minekonomrazvitiya_na_cop_29_prinyaty_resheniya_po_zapusku_rynochnyh_mehanizmov_dlya_uglerodnyh_rynkov.html
[12] http://static.government.ru/media/files/ADKkCzp3fWO32e2yA0BhtIpyzWfHaiUa.pdf
[13] https://ria.ru/20241112/sor29-1983387086.html
[14] Lanshina, T (2024) Climate Control: How Russia Turned the Environmental Agenda into an Instrument of Political Influence, The Insider 20 November, https://theins.ru/ekonomika/276168. Accessed 12 December 2024. In Russian.